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ABSTRACT 
 
It is a commonly held view that gold protects investors’ wealth in the event of negative 
economic conditions. In this study, we test whether other metals offer similar or better 
investment opportunities in periods of market turmoil. Using a sample of 13 sovereign bonds, 
we show that other precious metals, palladium in particular, offer investors greater 
compensation for their bond market losses than gold. We also find that industrial metals, 
especially copper, tend to outperform gold and other precious metals as hedging vehicles and 
safe haven assets against losses in sovereign bonds. However, the outcome of the hedge and 
safe haven properties is not always consistent across the different bonds. Finally, our analysis 
suggests that copper is the best performing metal in the period immediately after negative 
bond price shocks. 
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1. Introduction 
 The financial media normally regard gold as a safe haven asset. Its characteristics as a 
financial asset have also been widely explored in the academic literature. Gold has been a 
traditional investment vehicle since it serves as a hedge against inflation and a safe haven in 
periods of market crises (see e.g., Baur and McDermott, 2010; Daskalaki and Skiadopoulos, 
2011; Batten et al., 2013). It has also been widely documented that gold protects investors’ 
wealth against fluctuations in the foreign exchange value of the US dollar (Capie et al., 2005; 
Pukthuanthong and Roll, 2011; Reboredo, 2013 and Ciner et al., 2013). The observed 
increase in the value of gold during the recent financial crisis has motivated other researchers 
to test explicitly its viability as a safe haven from losses in other financial markets. Baur and 
McDermott (2010) show that gold protects investors against stock market shocks in major 
European countries and the US, but does not serve as a safe haven for Australia, Canada, 
Japan and emerging stock markets. Similarly, Baur and Lucey (2010) find that gold is a safe 
haven for stocks, but not for bonds, in the US, the UK and Germany.  
The main objective of this study is to investigate whether gold is a special investment 
vehicle or if it has become relegated in status to the same standing as other metals, which are 
primarily for industrial purposes and traded as commodities. There is no sound theoretical 
model to explain why gold may act as a safe haven, but a major explanation often put forward 
is that gold was among the first forms of money and has traditionally acted as an inflation 
hedge (Baur and Lucey, 2010). However, since the collapse of Bretton Woods system and the 
move to floating exchange rate regimes, the market for gold and silver have changed 
dramatically (Hillier et al., 2006). The monetary element of these precious metals has 
gradually been replaced and their industrial use has been extended. Furthermore, the 
extensive use of gold as a hedging vehicle has also sparked the utilization of other precious 
metals as risk management tools and diversifying commodity portfolios (see, e.g., Marshall et 
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al., 2008; Belousova and Dorfleitner, 2012). Since gold has more characteristics in common 
with other metals, particularly precious ones, than it does with any other commodities, 
investors may treat metals as a separate asset class (Belousova and Dorfleitner, 2012). This, 
in turn, would cause gold prices to comove more with metals than other commodities (see 
Pindyck and Rotember, 1990; Pierdzioch et al., 2013 among others)
2, 3
  
Consistent with the comovement evidence, Daskalaki and Skiadopoulos (2011) show 
that the returns on major precious metals, including gold, silver, platinum and palladium, 
exhibit low correlations with stock returns. Morales and Andreosso-O'Callaghan (2011) find 
that the precious metals markets are less affected by the recent global financial crisis than 
other major financial markets around the world. Erb and Harvey (2006) and Roache and 
Rossi (2010) also find that gold and silver prices are counter-cyclical, implying that precious 
metals other than gold may also protect investors’ wealth in the events of negative stock 
market conditions. Furthermore, observed marked data (see Figure 1 and Panel B of Table 2 
below) suggests that industrial metals also comove with precious metals. Thus, industrial 
metals may also serve as a place of safety in the events of negative economic conditions and 
this leads to the following important questions: (i) to what extent does gold protect investors’ 
wealth against sovereign-debt crisis? (ii) does gold offer a better protection against sovereign-
debt crisis than other metals? and (iii) is the protection, if any, offered by gold and other 
metals against sovereign credit deteriorations short- or long-lived?      
While the hedge and safe haven properties of gold have explicitly been examined in 
the context of both stock and bond markets (Baur and McDermott, 2010; and Baur and 
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 Gold and precious metals can be reused or recycled for new fabrication, which provide an additional source of 
supply. This is in stark contrast to energy, agricultural and livestock commodities which are spent, consumed, or 
transformed but are rarely recoverable. Metals also tend to have longer shelf lives and are less susceptible to 
adverse storage conditions than agricultural commodities. They can also be transported without the need for 
specialised infrastructure such as in the case of oil or natural resources.  
3
 Indeed, our correlation analysis (see Table 2 below) indicates that metals tend to co-move and the comovement 
is, in some cases, stronger during periods of crisis.  
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Lucey, 2010), the role of other precious and industrial metals as hedging vehicles and safe 
haven assets has not yet been explicitly explored. This study investigates the relative abilities 
of industrial and precious metals to protect investors’ losses in the sovereign debt markets. 
Existing studies tend to focus on assets that provide protection against investors’ losses in 
stock and foreign exchange markets, with government bonds typically seen as relatively safe 
assets. However, recent evidence suggests that sovereign debt markets, particularly in the 
Eurozone (except for Germany), have recently become more volatile due to the “flight to 
safety” syndrome that has gripped financial markets (Schwarz, 2008). Furthermore, the 
(unreported) finding that the correlation between the conditional volatility of government 
bonds and that of the world index increases significantly during crisis periods suggests that 
the extreme movements in sovereign bond markets may be representative of the crisis 
episodes
4
. Thus, since government bond markets are affected by the economic downturns and 
since sovereign debt crisis (e.g. the recent European sovereign debt crisis) and government 
defaults (e.g. Russia in 1998 and Argentina in 2001) are not uncommon, it would be useful 
for investors to identify asset classes that can protect their wealth against the sudden 
deterioration in the government bonds.  
While metals may not be the only place of safety
5
, we choose to focus on safe haven 
properties of these assets for, at least, two reasons. First, metals are the closest related assets 
to gold (a traditional “investment of last resort”). Second, metal prices are driven by the 
global demand as opposed to domestic demand in the case of many domestic bonds and 
stocks. In some cases, such as the recent European sovereign debt crisis, investors face losses 
on both (domestic) stocks and bonds and may, therefore, seek refuge from other asset classes.  
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 Further details on these tests are available upon request. 
5
 In unreported tests, we show that other commodities, including S&P GSCI agricultural index and S&P GSCI 
Crude Oil Index and stocks, namely MSCI BRIC Equity Index and MSCI World Equity Index, can also be used 
as a hedge and safe haven against losses in the sovereign bond market. Further details on these results can be 
obtained from the authors.    
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By investigating the role of metals in protecting investors against sovereign debt 
losses this study makes three important contributions to the literature. First, it provides a 
detailed analysis on the hedge and safe haven properties of gold and other selected metals 
against the deteriorations in the credit quality of sovereign bonds. Second, it tests whether the 
outcome of the hedge and safe haven properties of the metals against sovereign bonds is 
consistent across different sovereign bonds. Finally, it examines the performance of metals in 
periods following large negative bond price changes to evaluate the speed at which investors 
recover losses from extreme negative bond price movements and the profit (or loss) 
associated with holding different metals in periods of high bond market turmoil.  
Our empirical analysis focuses on sovereign bonds in the US, the UK, the EMU and 
ten Eurozone countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) and yields the following interesting findings. First, we find 
that gold serves as a strong hedge only for bonds in Belgium, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands 
and Portugal and a strong safe haven for bonds in Finland, Spain and the EMU. Second, other 
precious metals, palladium in particular, outperform gold both as a hedge and safe haven 
asset and bond investors are even better off holding industrial rather than precious metals in 
periods of extreme negative shocks. The superiority of industrial metals in protecting 
investors against losses in the US and European bonds may be attributed to increased demand 
for these metals from major emerging countries, such as the BRIC, which have not been 
strongly affected by the recent crisis. Third, we show that gold commoves strongly with both 
UK and German bonds in periods of high bond market volatility. This evidence is consistent 
with the “flight to safety” argument, and that investors may view high quality bonds, such as 
the UK and German bonds, and gold as substitutes in protecting themselves against the 
downturns in the government bond markets. Finally, we find that copper (palladium) is the 
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best performing industrial (precious) metal in the period immediately after extreme negative 
bond price changes.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review 
of the literature on the role of metals in the financial systems. Section 3 presents a description 
and summary statistics of our data. Section 4 describes the methodology. Section 5 contains 
the results of our analysis and Section 6 offers our concluding remarks. 
 
2. A brief review of the related literature 
The markets did not expect at the time when Greece had the highest credit rating by 
top agents that its deep debt problems could trigger the European sovereign-debt crisis. The 
deterioration of government finance after 2008 led to a sudden loss of confidence in both 
sovereign debt and equity markets and drove the prices of alternative investments, such as 
gold and the precious metals to record highs. The impressive performance of metals 
(especially gold) during the economic downturns, in general, and recent European sovereign-
debt, in particular, presents a strong motivation to examine the characteristics of these assets 
and their role in the global financial system.  
 A number of other studies, including Jaffe (1989), Chua et al. (1990) and Draper et al. 
(2006), focus on the role of metals in portfolio diversification. Their general findings suggest 
that investments in metals and other commodities help to improve the overall performance of 
stock and bond portfolios. Draper et al. (2006) show that gold, silver and platinum have low 
correlations with stock index returns. Their evidence implies that these metals may provide 
diversification within broad investment portfolios. Conover et al. (2009) examines the 
benefits of adding precious metals (gold, silver and platinum) to U.S. equity portfolios. They 
evaluate different weights (from 5% to 25%) of these metals in a typical portfolio and find 
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that adding a 25% allocation of precious metals to a portfolio consisting of equities 
substantially improves the portfolio performance.  
 The role of precious metals in protecting investors’ wealth against negative economic 
conditions has also been widely investigated. Chow et al. (1999) suggest that commodities, 
including metals, are more attractive when the general financial climate is negative. Edwards 
and Caglayan (2001) support this position by demonstrating that commodity funds provide 
higher returns when stocks perform poorly. This evidence suggests that the inclusion of key 
commodity contracts should provide a positive contribution to more broad-based financial 
trading and investments. Erb and Harvey (2006) and Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) show 
that gold and other major precious metals are useful for hedging against inflation. Draper et 
al. (2006) also show that precious metals have hedging capability and a potential for playing 
the role of safe havens, particularly during periods of abnormal stock market volatility. Baur 
(2013) analyzes monthly gold returns over the period 1980-2010 and finds that September 
and November are the only months with significantly positive gold price changes. He argues 
that investors seemed to have learned that some of the most extreme periods of financial 
turmoil occur in September and October (e.g. the stock market crash in October 1987, the 
Asian financial crisis in October 1997 and the Global Financial Crisis in September and 
October 2008). This leads to increased purchases of gold during these months to hedge 
against the potential financial turmoil (see also Bouman and Jacobsen, 2002; Jacobsen and 
Zhang, 2012)
6
. 
 Erb and Harvey (2006) show that the prices of precious metals and industrial metals 
react differently to economic shocks. This is because a surprise improvement in economic 
growth may cause gold and silver prices to drop because of portfolio rebalancing effects, but 
result in higher industrial metal prices due to greater industrial demand. Roache and Rossi 
                                                          
6 It is also possible that investors buy gold as an insurance against stock market losses before they are heavily 
invested in stocks, that is, between November and May establishing the “Halloween effect” or the “sell in May 
and go away effect”. 
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(2010) suggest that announcements which reflect an unexpected improvement in the 
economy
7
 tend to have a negative impact on gold and silver prices, but a positive effect on 
copper. This is attributed to the fact that copper and other industrial metals are important 
input goods in manufacturing and production related industries (about 70% of the demand for 
copper comes from electrical and construction industries), and a more sanguine economic 
climate would be indicative of greater demand for this industrial metal. Elder et al. (2012) use 
intra-day data to examine the intensity, direction and speed of the impact of U.S. 
macroeconomic news announcement on the return, volatility and trading volume of metal 
futures. They report that announcements which reflect an unexpected improvement in the 
economy tend to have a negative impact on gold and silver prices and a positive effect on 
copper prices. However, observed market data (see Figure 1 below) suggests that both 
industrial and precious metals enjoy some price appreciation during crisis periods. 
While many studies highlight the potential ability of precious metals (gold in 
particular) to serve as safe haven against losses in financial markets, this claim has rarely 
been explicitly tested in the literature. In fact, Baur and McDermott (2010) and Baur and 
Lucey (2010) appear to be the only studies that directly examine the role of gold as a hedge 
and safe haven against losses in stock and bond markets. Baur and McDermott (2010) find 
that gold may act as a stabilizing force for the financial system by reducing losses in the face 
of extreme negative market shocks. They also show that gold is both a hedge and a safe 
haven for major European markets and the US but not for Australia, Canada, Japan and large 
emerging markets, such as the BRIC countries. Baur and Lucey (2010) examine the safe 
haven property in the context of German, UK and US stock and bond markets. They show 
that gold is a safe haven for stocks, but not bonds. Thus, the ability of gold to serve as a 
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and investment (e.g., durable goods orders). 
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hedging and/or a safe haven asset may vary significantly across different markets and asset 
classes.  
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
The data sample covers the period from July 1993 to June 2012. Our analysis focuses 
on this period due to lack of data for some industrial metals before July 1993. Daily data on 
the closing US dollar prices are collected for each industrial and precious metal. The precious 
metals used in this study are Gold, Silver, Platinum and Palladium. The industrial metals 
group consists of Aluminium, Copper, Lead, Nickel, Tin and Zinc. We also collect daily data 
for the US dollar to pound exchange rate and US dollar to euro exchange rate. We then 
calculate the closing prices of the metals in pounds and euros using the dollar prices of the 
metals and the foreign exchange rates. This is done to ensure that the return on metals and the 
return on bonds in the subsequent analysis are denominated in the same currency.
8
  
Figure 1 reports the daily movements of metal prices over the entire sample period. It 
shows that gold price has exhibited a phenomenal increase during the financial crisis. Its 
price increased from $634.5 per oz in January 2007 to $942.9 in July 2008. The largest drop 
in gold price was observed in the period between August and December 2008. Gold price 
reached its peak of almost $1,800 per oz in 2011. Similar price patterns are also observed in 
the case of other precious metals. Silver price, for example, increased from $11.24 per oz in 
the beginning of 2007 to $15.37 per oz in January 2008. Similar to the case of gold, silver 
value declined sharply between September and December 2008. The behaviour of industrial 
metals during the crisis is not very much different from that of the precious ones. For 
instance, the price of Copper rose from $6380 in January 2007 to $6641 in January 2008 and 
its value began to decline in the second half of 2008. Copper price started to rise again in 
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 For example, when examining the hedge properties of metals against bonds denominated in euros, we use the 
euro prices to calculate the return on the metals. 
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beginning of 2009 and reached its peak of around $10000 in 2011. Overall, Figure 1 suggests 
that metal prices tend to move together over time. Specifically, it shows that metal prices 
were generally stable prior to June 2005. It also shows that all metal prices increased 
dramatically during the period 2005-2007; declined sharply in 2007; pick up again in July 
2008 and started to decline in February 2011. This finding implies that bond market investors 
may find metals other than gold as useful hedging instruments in periods of high financial 
and economic uncertainty.         
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please Insert Figure 1 About Here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Closing return index values for 5-year, 10-year and 30-year benchmark bonds for the 
US, the UK, the EMU benchmark and ten euro-zone countries with the relevant data are 
collected. The euro-zone countries in our sample are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The return index on the benchmark 
bonds are denominated in the local currency. All the data (dollar closing prices of metals, 
foreign exchange rate and the return index on benchmark bonds) are obtained from the 
DataStream database. Benchmark bond data for Greece is only available for 10-year 
maturities and Finland and Portugal did not have data for the 30-year bond. As a result, we 
present results mainly for the 10-year bonds but we obtain similar results for the other 
maturities
9
. The EMU benchmark data starts from January 1999. 
 Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the return distributions of bonds, metals 
and the world index. Whilst bonds and metals exhibit similar average returns, the returns on 
bonds is relatively more stable than those on metals. Gold is the most stable metal with 
returns ranging from a minimum of -0.0714 to a maximum of 0.0003 and a standard 
deviation of 0.0104. With the exception of Greece, bonds exhibit lower risk (standard 
deviation) and less extreme values than gold and other metals. The data also illustrates that 
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 More details on the results of the 5- and 30-year bonds are available upon request.  
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the return on the world index is more stable than the returns on metals, but more volatile than 
the returns on bonds.  
Table 2 also presents the correlations between various metals in different states of the 
economy. Specifically, it reports both the average correlations and the correlations during 
crisis periods, which are defined as the three calendar months following each of the Asian 
crisis (October 22, 1997) and the global finance crisis (September 10, 2008)
10
. Several 
interesting observations can be made from the correlation results. First, consistent with the 
comovement view, metal prices are all positively correlated. Second, precious metals tend to 
co-move more amongst themselves than with industrial metals, and vice versa. Third, the 
comovement between metals is stronger during episodes of crisis. Specifically, we find that, 
except for Zinc, the correlations between individual metals and the Industrial Metals Index 
(IMD) increase during the crisis periods. With the exception of Zinc and Lead, the 
correlations between industrial metals and the Precious Metal Index (PMD) also increase 
during the times of crisis. Finally, we find that individual precious metals co-move more with 
PMDX (the portfolio of all precious metals excluding the individual precious metal in the 
correlation, but less with IMD (except for palladium), during the crisis periods. The increased 
commovement between metals during episodes of crisis indicates that gold may not be the 
only place of safety and other metals may protect investors’ wealth in the economic 
downturn.            
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please Insert Tables 1 and 2 About Here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 These dates are also used by Baur and McDermott (2010) in their definition of the pick of the Asian and the 
global financial crisis. 
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4. Methodology  
There is already strong evidence that gold protects investors’ wealth during times of 
uncertainty and instability (Wallace and Choudhry, 1995; Davidson et al., 2003; Bordo and 
MacDonald, 2003; Baur and Lucey, 2010 and Baur, 2013). However, this study addresses a 
different question, namely do other precious and industrial metals offer similar, or even 
better, investment opportunities in periods of crisis? To assess the hedge and safe haven 
properties of industrial and precious metals against sovereign debt, we use a methodology 
similar to that of Baur and McDermott (2010). Eqs(1a), (1b) and (1c) present the principal 
regression model used to analyse the role of precious and industrial metals as hedge and/or 
safe haven investment assets for sovereign bonds. We assume that changes in the precious or 
industrial metals prices are dependent on changes in the bond market. Further, we speculate 
that extreme market conditions affect the balance of the relationship.  
Let  denote the local currency return on the respective metal and  be the 
local currency return on the benchmark bond index. Then, as in Baur and McDermott (2010), 
we model the return generating process of the metals as: 
 
                                                                                    (1a)  
                                                                                   (1b) 
                                                                                     (1c) 
where , D5 and D10 are dummy variables, which are used to capture extreme bond market 
movements, with values of one if the bond return on day t falls in the lower 1
st
, 5
th
 and 10
th
 
percentile, respectively, and zero otherwise. The error term, et, assumed to follow a GARCH 
(1, 1) process with a time varying variance, . The GARCH (1, 1) process is used to control 
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for heteroscedasticity in the data, which is common in daily financial data
11
. The coefficients  
 (for i = 0, 1, 2, 3) measure the hedge and safe haven properties of the metal under 
consideration. Specifically, a significantly negative estimate for  would suggest that the 
metal is a strong hedge against the sovereign bond. If  is not statistically different from 
zero, then the metal is considered as weak hedge. However, a metal is not a hedge if  is 
positive and statistically significant. Nonlinearities in the hedge property are captured through 
the parameters δ1, δ2 or δ3. If one of the parameters δ1, δ2 or δ3 is significantly different from 
zero, this will indicate a non-linear relationship between the metal and the sovereign bond. 
For a metal to be considered a safe haven, it must offer protection against extreme adverse 
market conditions in the sovereign bond market. In other words, a metal would only be 
viewed as a safe haven in given threshold of extreme shocks when the sum of the relevant 
exposure coefficients  (  in the case of negative returns in the lower 1
st
 
percentile,  for the negative returns in the lower 5
th
 percentile and 
 for the negative returns in lower 10
th
 percentile) is significantly negative 
(strong safe haven) or not statistically different from zero (weak safe haven).  A metal is not a 
safe haven if the sum of the exposure coefficients is positive and statistically significant. 
Thus, we focus on the statistical significance of the sum of the estimates, rather than simply 
the sum of the estimates, as in Baur and McDermott (2010). We take this approach to control 
for disparities in estimation precision due to differences in the residual variances across the 
various types of bonds. It should be noted that the coefficient estimates from models with 
high residual variances suffer from a lack of precision. Such coefficient estimates could be 
spurious or simply due to chance, regardless of the size and/or direction of the estimates. For 
these reasons, we focus on the relationships that are statistically significant. 
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 Note that Eqs(1a), (1b) and (1c) are estimated using weekly and monthly data. Despite some quantitative 
differences, our final conclusions do not seem to depend on the return frequencies used in the analysis. More 
details on these results are available upon request.  
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5. Empirical results 
In this section, we present the empirical results on the hedge and/or safe haven properties of 
precious and industrial metals against the sovereign debt price movements using both 
individual and portfolio approach. We also use sub-period analysis to test whether the role of 
metals varies across market conditions. Finally, we assess the speed at which investors 
recover losses from the sharp decline in bond prices and the profit (or loss) associated with 
holding metals jointly with sovereign bonds in the periods of crisis. 
 
5.1. Individual precious metals  
Table 3 presents the estimation results for the models in Eqs(1a), (1b) and (1c) with 
individual precious metals as the dependent variables in Eq(1a). The results indicate that the 
values and the statistical significance of the hedging coefficients  vary considerably across 
bonds and precious metals. The hedging parameters  indicate that gold is a strong hedge for 
bonds in Belgium, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal and a weak hedge for the rest 
of sovereign bonds. The statistical significance of the estimates ,   and   in Eq(1b) 
implies the presence of non-linear relationship between gold and bond returns in many cases, 
particularly for extreme negative shocks in the lower 10
th
 and 5
th
 percentiles
12
.  
The results in Table 3 indicate that the safe haven property of gold, which implies that 
investors that hold gold receive compensation for losses caused by extreme negative bond 
returns through positive gold returns, seems to depend largely on the magnitude of the 
negative shock in the bond prices. For this, we use Wald test to investigate the statistical 
significance of the parameters ,  and . For extreme negative bond returns in the 
lower 1
st
 percentile, gold is not a safe haven for Germany and the EMU benchmark bonds as 
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 The parameters ,  and  in Eq(1b) are not report in the Table to save space. More detailed on the non-
linear relationship between bonds and metals are available from the authors. 
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 is significantly positive in these two cases, but gold appears to be a weak safe haven for 
the remaining sovereign bonds. The parameters and  suggest that gold is mainly a 
weak safe haven against negative shocks in the lower 5
th
 and 10
th
 percentiles. It only serves 
as a strong safe haven for bonds in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands 
for extreme negative returns in the lower 5
th
 percentile and for the bond in Portugal for 
negative shocks in the lower 10
th
 percentile.  
The sign of the coefficients  in Table 3 suggests that bond returns are negatively 
related with silver returns on average, and silver is, therefore, a hedge for all sovereign bonds. 
However, the statistical significance of these coefficients implies that the hedging ability of 
silver is strong only for bonds in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Portugal. Our findings also suggest that the non-linear relationship is less (more) pronounced 
in the case of silver rather than of the gold for extreme shocks in the 10
th
 and 5
th
 (1
st
) 
percentile. The sums of the relevant exposure coefficients δi ( ,  and ) imply that 
silver is, at best, a weak safe haven for the sovereign bonds except those of France and the 
Netherlands.  
Similar evidence is also reported in the case of platinum and palladium. Specifically, 
the parameters  in Table 3 indicate that platinum serves as a hedge for all the sovereign 
bonds except Greece. The hedging ability of platinum is strong in the cases of bonds in 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the UK and weak for the remaining bonds. 
Our findings also suggest that the relationship between platinum and sovereign bonds is 
mainly linear and non-linearity is only detected in Portuguese bonds for extreme shocks in 
the lower 1
st
 percentile. Palladium also hedges against all bonds except Greece, with hedging 
performance being strong for Austria, Germany, the EMU benchmark and UK bonds. The 
non-linear relationship between palladium and bond returns is detected in many markets and 
is more pronounced for extreme shocks in the lower 10
th
 percentile. Platinum is at least a 
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weak safe haven asset for all sovereign bonds, except Greece. The relevant coefficient 
estimates ( ,  and ) suggest that the safe haven hypothesis in the case of palladium 
is supported in all markets, except Finland and Portugal in the case of extreme negative 
returns in the lower 5
th
 percentile. 
Our evidence so far suggests that gold can be used as a hedging vehicle or a safe 
haven varies in certain sovereign bond markets. More specifically, we find that gold provides 
a stronger hedge against weaker bonds, such as Greece, Italy and Portugal, than stronger 
ones, including Germany, UK and the US. For extreme negative bond returns in the lower 1
st
 
percentile, gold exhibits a significant positive association with German bonds, implying that 
investors view stronger bonds and gold as substitutes in their flight to safety. The finding 
aligns with Beber et al.’s (2009) argument, which suggests that investors tend to rebalance 
their portfolios towards less risky and more liquid securities in times of economic distress. It 
is also consistent with Schwarz (2008), who explains the increases in the spreads of sovereign 
debt within the Eurozone (excluding German government bonds) by the sudden decline in the 
government bond market liquidity due to the flight to safety syndrome that has gripped the 
financial markets in recent crisis. Unreported analysis however suggests that while some high 
quality sovereign bonds, UK and US bonds in particular, exhibit some negative comovement 
with Greek bonds, gold and other metals provide far much better protection against losses in 
the sovereign bond markets
13
. Our analysis also implies that gold is not the only place for 
safety or refuge and in many cases other precious metals could offer similar, if not better, 
protection in the events of negative economic conditions. The strong correlation between 
gold and other precious metals in times of economic distress is consistent with the widely 
held view that investors treat gold and other precious metals as a similar investment class 
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 The details of the results are available upon request. 
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(see, e.g. Erb and Harvey, 2006; Daskalaki and Skiadopoulos, 2011; Elder et al., 2012; 
among others). 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please Insert Table 3 About Here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
5.2. Individual industrial metals 
Table 4 reports the estimation results for Eqs(1a), (1b) and (1c) for individual metals 
as the dependent variable in Eq(1a). We find that industrial metals offer a much stronger 
hedge against adverse movements in sovereign debt prices than gold or any other precious 
metal. The coefficient  is negative for all sovereign bonds and industrial metals used in the 
analysis. The magnitude of  is much larger and more significant for the industrial metals 
than the precious metals, indicating that investors receive better compensation for adverse 
bond price movements when holding the former than the latter. With the exception of the UK 
bonds in the case of aluminium and Greek bonds in cases of lead, nickel and zinc, the 
parameter  is negative and statistically significant, implying that industrial metals offer a 
strong hedge against the adverse movements in the sovereign bond prices.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please Insert Table 4 About Here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
In unreported tests, we find that the coefficients  (for i = 1, 2, 3) are significant in 
many cases, indicating the presence of non-linear relationship between industrial metals and 
bond returns. The results of the Wald test on ,  and  in Table 4 suggest that the 
safe haven property of industrial metal tends to be stronger than that of precious metals. 
Apart from Greece and Portugal in the case of Aluminium and Copper, and Finland, Portugal 
and Spain in the case of Nickel, industrial metals offer at least a weak safe haven to the 
sovereign bonds.  
Overall, industrial metals seem to outperform precious metals as hedging vehicles and 
safe haven assets against losses in the sovereign debt markets. The ability of industrial metals 
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in protecting investors against losses in the US and European bonds may be attributed to 
increased demand for these metals from major emerging countries, including the BRIC, 
which have not been less strongly affected by the recent crisis.   
 
5.3.  The portfolio approach 
Table 5 shows the estimates of Eqs(1a), (1b) and (1c) using equally weighted 
portfolios of precious metals, industrial metals and all metals as the dependent variable in 
Eq(1a), respectively. The purpose of this analysis is to investigate whether investors gain 
better protection against the adverse movements in the sovereign bonds by holding portfolios 
rather than individual metals. The coefficient  in Table 5 implies that the hedging power of 
the metal portfolio varies considerably across bonds. Specifically, the portfolio of precious 
metals serves as a strong hedge for bonds in Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, the 
EMU and the UK and a weak hedge for the remaining bonds. However, the values of  
associated with industrial metals and all metals portfolios are negative and statistically 
significant, with the portfolio of industrial metals containing the largest (negative) and 
highest significant hedging coefficients, . This result implies that the portfolio of industrial 
metals outperforms both the portfolio of precious metals and that of all metals in its hedging 
ability against adverse movements in sovereign bonds. However, some individual industrial 
metals, such as copper, seem to provide a stronger hedge against all bonds than any of the 
three portfolios. 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please Insert Table 5 About Here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 The parameters ,  and  in Table 5 suggests that the portfolio of precious 
metals serves a strong safe haven only for Italian bonds for shocks in the lower 1
th
 and 10
th
 
percentiles. The portfolio of industrial metals serves as strong safe haven for bonds in 
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Germany, the Netherland and the EMU in the case of negative shocks in the lower 1
st
 
percentile and for bonds in the Netherlands, the UK and the US for negative bond returns in 
the lower 10
th
 percentile. The safe haven property of the portfolio of all metals is shown to be 
strong only for bonds in the Netherlands and the US for negative bond returns in the lower 5
th
 
and 10
th
 percentiles, respectively. These findings, therefore, suggest that industrial metals 
offer a better protection against the deterioration of the sovereign debt quality than the 
precious metals.  
 
6.4. Sub-period analysis   
To gain a further insight on whether metals protect investors’ wealth against the 
stormy weather, we divide our sample period into three sub-periods, July 1993 to December 
2000, January 2001 to December 2006 and January 2007 to June 2012. The last sub-period 
includes the global financial crisis, which originated as the subprime crisis in 2007 and 
peaked in September 2008, and the on-going European debt crisis.  
Table 6 presents the estimates of Eqs.(1a), (1b) and (1c) for individual precious 
metals for the three sub-periods. To save space, Table 6 only reports the hedge parameter  
and one safe haven measure, .
14
 The exposure estimates  suggest that the hedging 
power of precious metals is tend to vary considerably over time. The results in Panel A of 
Table 6 suggest that gold and silver serve as a strong hedge in more markets in the period 
1993-2000 than the other two sub-periods. In the period 2001-2006 (see Panel B), the 
statistical significance of the hedging coefficients disappears almost completely in the cases 
of gold, silver and platinum, suggesting that these instruments offer only a weak hedge 
against the adverse movements in the sovereign bond prices. During the same period, 
palladium serves as a weak hedge for only the US sovereign bond, but does not compensate 
                                                          
14
 Detailed results on Eqs(1a), (1b) and (1c) estimates for individual and portfolio of metals are available upon 
request.  
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investors for the adverse bond price movements in other markets. In the period 2007-2012 
(see Panel C), gold offers a strong hedge for bonds in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, a 
weak hedge for bonds in Austria, Belgium, France, the UK and the US and a no hedge for 
bonds in Finland, Germany and the EMU. The significantly positive comovement between 
gold and the German bond could also suggest that investors viewed the two assets as 
substitutes in their flight to safety following the euro debt crises. This evidence is consistent 
with Beber et al. (2009) finding that, in times of economic distress, investors rebalance their 
portfolios towards less risky and more liquid securities.  
Silver’s hedging coefficients are mainly negative, but not statistically different from 
zero, indicating that this metal serves as a weak hedge against losses in the sovereign bond 
markets. Platinum exhibits significantly positive comovements with bonds in Greece and 
Spain, but hedges against losses in the rest of the markets (the hedge is strong in Finland, 
Germany, Netherland, the EMU and the UK, but weak in Austria, Belgium, Italy and the 
US). Palladium serves as a hedge in all markets, with the hedge being strong in 8 out of the 
13 bonds included in the analysis. Thus, palladium outperforms other precious metals as a 
hedge against the deterioration in the credit quality of sovereign bonds in the period 2007-
2012. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please Insert Table 6 About Here 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The results in Table 6 also suggest that the safe haven properties of the precious 
metals vary over time. In the period 1993-2001 (see Panel A), the safe haven test indicates 
that gold is largely a weak safe haven in all markets except Greece. In the period 2001-2006 
(see Panel B), gold is a strong safe haven for bonds in Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Netherlands, Portugal and  the EMU benchmark bond for negative shocks in the lower 5
th
 
percentile. Besides gold, palladium also offered some safe haven protection for some bonds 
during the period. These include Germany, Greece, the UK and the US. Silver and platinum 
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are at best weak safe havens during this period as the safe haven tests are largely not 
significantly different from zero. In the period 2007-2012 (see Panel C), gold offers a safe 
haven against Italian and Portuguese bonds. However, we also find a strong comovement 
between gold and UK, German and the EMU benchmark bonds, suggesting that gold is not a 
safe haven for these bonds. The a strong comovement between gold and the UK and German 
bonds is also consistent with the “flight to safety” argument, which would indicate that 
investors may view high quality bonds, such as the UK and German bonds, and gold as 
substitutes in protecting themselves against lower quality bonds. Palladium also serves as a 
strong safe haven against extreme negative shocks in six out of the 13 bonds. For shocks in 
the lower 1
st
 percentile, palladium offers a safe haven for the bonds in Finland, Germany, 
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and the EMU benchmark bond and a weak safe haven for the rest 
of the sovereign bonds. Thus, in this particular period palladium offers greater protection in 
more markets than the other precious metals.             
  Table 7 reports the results of the sub-period analysis for the industrial metals. Again 
for the sake of brevity, only  and are reported and the rest of the results are available 
upon request. The results in Table 7 suggest that the time variation in the hedging power is 
less pronounced for industrial than precious metals. The hedging parameters  suggest that 
industrial metals serve at least as a weak hedge. Our results also suggest that copper is the 
strongest hedging assets and investors are more likely to be protected from losses in the bond 
markets by holding industrial rather than precious metals. In the period 1993-2000 (see Panel 
A), industrial metals mainly serve as a weak safe haven against different categories of 
extreme negative bond returns. However, as shown in panel B, the sums of the relevant 
exposure coefficients are significantly negative almost across all the bonds for shocks in the 
lower 10
th
 percentile, during the period 2001-2006. This finding suggests that industrial 
metals serve as a strong safe haven against extreme bond price fluctuations during this 
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period. In the period 2007-2012 (see panel C), the statistical significance of the safe haven 
parameters associated with the industrial metals disappears in most cases. However, some 
industrial metals, particularly copper and lead, still serve as a strong safe haven in more cases 
than gold. Overall, the safe haven properties of some lesser known metals, such as palladium, 
copper and lead are much better than those of the popular metals such as gold, silver and 
aluminium.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Please Insert Table 7 About Here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 We also conduct sub-period analysis for the various portfolios of metals. While the 
details are not reported to save space, the results suggest that as portfolios, industrial metals 
serve as a stronger hedge for more markets than precious metals. The portfolio of industrial 
metals is a strong safe haven in all the markets except the US in the period 2001-06 but 
largely a weak safe haven in the later period 2007-12. On the other hand, we find that safe 
haven property of precious metals is weak in both periods. Thus, in general, the portfolio of 
industrial metals provides a better protection for investors’ losses in the sovereign bond 
market, particularly in periods of high bond market turmoil, than the portfolio of precious 
metals. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------        
6.5. The post-shock performance 
The dummy coefficients in Eq(1b) focus on the correlation between bonds and metals on the 
day of the shock and does not tell us anything about the post-shock performance of these 
assets. This section analyses the average cumulative returns of portfolios comprising of 
individual sovereign bonds and the individual metals over a period of 20 trading days 
(approximately one calendar month) following extreme negative bond returns. The analysis 
sheds some light on the speed at which investors recover losses from declining bond prices 
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and the profit (or loss) associated with holding metals along with sovereign bonds in the 
crisis periods.  
To save space, we only report the average cumulative returns of the equally weighted 
portfolios of the bonds with the various metals following extreme negative bond returns in 
the lower 5
th
 percentile, and for the cases of the EMU benchmark, the UK and the US 
bonds
15
. Figure 2 shows the average cumulative returns of portfolios consisting of individual 
sovereign bonds and metals. It shows that palladium consistently outperforms gold and other 
precious metals in its ability to compensate investors for losses in the sovereign bond 
markets. Investors who hold gold, silver, platinum and palladium, respectively, with the 
EMU sovereign bonds enjoy their first positive returns of 0.09%, 0.1%, 0.05% and 0.03% in 
about 15, 13, 13 and 9 days following extreme negative shocks in the lower 5
th
 percentile. 
Similar findings are evident when individual precious metals are held with the UK or the US 
sovereign bonds. Specifically, while the returns associated with a portfolio of palladium and 
UK sovereign bond begin to turn positive 8 days after extreme shocks, the portfolio that 
includes silver turns positive after 19 days. The other two portfolios comprising the UK 
sovereign bond and gold or silver remain negative throughout the post-shock period covered 
in the analysis. Figure 2 also shows that investors in the US sovereign bonds recover their 
losses from extreme negative price movements more quickly by holding palladium than any 
other precious metals. In short, our results palladium (gold) offers investors the highest 
(lowest) compensation for their losses in the sovereign bond market.    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please Insert Figures 2, 3 and 4 About Here 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 3 presents the average cumulative returns of portfolios consisting of individual 
bonds and industrial metals over a period of 20 trading days subsequent to extreme negative 
                                                          
15 Despite some quantitative differences, our conclusions remain largely valid for other sovereign bonds and 
negative shocks in the lower 10th and 1st percentiles. The details of this further analysis are available upon request.     
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bond returns in the lower 5
th
 percentile. The figure shows that copper generates higher post-
shock returns than any other industrial metals. It also shows investors recover their bond 
market losses more quickly by holding copper with their sovereign bonds. The result in 
Figures 2 and 3 also implies that copper is the best metal to be held in conjunction with the 
US sovereign bond, as it copper generates higher post-shock returns than palladium, the best 
performing precious metal. Figure 4 implies that metals seem to offer better protection 
against the adverse movements in the bond prices when held individually than as a portfolio. 
It also shows that the portfolio of precious metals outperform (underperform) that of 
industrial metals after extreme negative shocks in the EMU and the UK (the US) sovereign 
bonds.  
Overall, this analysis suggests that i) metals offer a better protection against the 
negative movements in the sovereign bond market when held individually than as portfolios; 
ii) all precious metals and many industrial metals outperform gold in protecting investors 
against losses in the sovereign debt market; and iii) copper is the best performing metal in the 
period immediately after negative bond price shocks.           
 
6. Conclusion 
This study provides new evidence on the role of precious and industrial metals as 
hedging vehicles and safe haven assets. Consistent existing evidence, we also find evidence 
that metal prices tend to co-move (see, e.g. Pindyck and Rotember, (1990) and Pierdzioch et 
al. (2013)). In particular we document that gold is a strong hedge for sovereign bonds of 
countries with serious debt issues (i.e. Greece, Italy and Portugal). The safe haven property of 
gold depends on the magnitude of the extreme negative bond price movement. More 
importantly, we show gold is not the useful metal for seeking safety in turbulent times. It is 
therefore worthwhile for individual and financial institutions to consider investing in other 
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precious and industrial metals in the event of negative economic conditions. This translates 
that industrial metals offer a stronger hedge against the adverse movements in sovereign debt 
prices than gold or any other precious metal. The outperformance of industrial metals as risk 
management vehicles in the government bond markets is attributed to their increasing global 
demand as they are seen as key indicators of the health of the global economy.   
 Furthermore, this study shows that a portfolio of industrial metals outperforms a 
portfolio of precious metals and that of all other metals in as a hedging instrument against the 
adverse movement in sovereign bonds. In terms of sub-period analysis, there is strong 
evidence that industrial metals provide a better compensation for investor losses particularly 
in periods of high bond market turmoil. Palladium, copper and lead serve as a strong safe 
haven as they are able to hedge against the deterioration in the credit quality during the recent 
financial crises.  
 In response to the issues raised in the introduction, the findings of this paper imply 
four major findings. Firstly, gold is a good investment opportunity during financial crises 
periods, but other precious and even industrial metals constitute better investment 
alternatives. Secondly, investors are better off holding industrial rather than precious metals 
in the periods of stormy weather. Thirdly, all metals have the ability to protect investors’ 
wealth against sovereign crises. Finally, as the hedge and safe haven properties of gold and 
other metals vary across bonds, a tactical allocation strategy that manages the bond-metal 
composition may be necessary to protect investors’ wealth against extreme losses in the 
government bond markets.  
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Table 1: Description of the sample 
This table presents descriptive statistics of the returns on the bond indices, precious metals, 
industrial metals and the FTSE World Stock Index. The returns on the metals and the FTSE 
World Index are in US dollars but the returns on the bonds are in local currency. 
 
Minimum Median Mean Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 
No. of 
Observations 
Austria -0.0234 0.0002 0.0003 0.0177 0.0033 4788 
Belgium -0.0261 0.0003 0.0003 0.0333 0.0036 4788 
Finland -0.0429 0.0003 0.0003 0.0285 0.0036 4788 
France -0.0200 0.0003 0.0003 0.0231 0.0037 4788 
Germany -0.0248 0.0004 0.0003 0.0224 0.0035 4788 
Greece -0.1727 0.0002 -0.0003 0.2885 0.0118 3342 
Italy -0.0360 0.0003 0.0003 0.0581 0.0045 4788 
Netherlands -0.0174 0.0003 0.0003 0.0186 0.0033 4788 
Portugal -0.1139 0.0003 0.0002 0.1125 0.0062 4769 
Spain -0.0257 0.0003 0.0003 0.0642 0.0041 4788 
EMU -0.0149 0.0003 0.0002 0.0224 0.0035 3404 
UK -0.0227 0.0003 0.0003 0.0243 0.0041 4788 
US -0.0283 0.0002 0.0003 0.0405 0.0048 4788 
Gold$ -0.0714 0.0002 0.0003 0.0738 0.0104 4788 
Silver$ -0.1869 0.0000 0.0004 0.1828 0.0206 4788 
Platinum$ -0.1554 0.0000 0.0003 0.1393 0.0144 4788 
Palladium$ -0.1786 0.0000 0.0003 0.1584 0.0220 4788 
Aluminium$ -0.1268 0.0000 0.0001 0.1171 0.0122 4788 
Copper$ -0.1048 0.0003 0.0003 0.1173 0.0174 4788 
Lead$ -0.1320 0.0005 0.0003 0.1301 0.0206 4788 
Nickel$ -0.1836 -0.0003 0.0003 0.1331 0.0231 4777 
Zinc$ -0.1262 0.0002 0.0001 0.0961 0.0184 4783 
Tin$ -0.1145 0.0000 0.0003 0.1539 0.0165 4778 
FTSE World $ -0.0732 0.0008 0.0002 0.0904 0.0101 4664 
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Table 2: Correlations between metals 
This table reports the correlation between metals over the sample period and during crisis 
periods only. Crisis period is defined as three months following the Asian financial crisis in 
October 1997 and the Global Financial Crisis in September 2008. PMD (IMD) represents 
portfolio of all precious (industrial) metals, PMDX (IMDX) represents portfolio of all 
precious (industrial) metals excluding the metal in that column. 
Panel A: Precious Metals – Full sample period 
  Gold Silver Platinum Palladium PMD IMD 
Gold 1.000 
     Silver 0.437 1.000 
    Platinum 0.287 0.451 1.000 
   Palladium 0.300 0.383 0.428 1.000 
  PMDX 0.441 0.541 0.528 0.480 NA 
 IMD 0.286 0.199 0.115 0.232 0.277 1.000 
Panel B: Precious Metals – Crisis period only 
  Gold Silver Platinum Palladium PMD IMD 
Gold 1.000 
     Silver 0.477 1.000 
    Platinum 0.274 0.537 1.000 
   Palladium 0.316 0.330 0.507 1.000 
  PMDX 0.451 0.562 0.608 0.485 NA 
 IMD 0.227 0.068 0.091 0.431 0.276 1.000 
Panel C: Industrial Metals – Full sample period 
  Alum Copper Lead Nickel Zinc Tin PMD IMD 
Alum 1.000 
       Copper 0.527 1.000 
      Lead 0.407 0.569 1.000 
     Nickel 0.389 0.564 0.477 1.000 
    Zinc 0.471 0.661 0.622 0.531 1.000 
   Tin 0.352 0.475 0.431 0.433 0.443 1.000 
  IMDX 0.543 0.741 0.656 0.622 0.725 0.546 
  PMD 0.199 0.232 0.224 0.175 0.219 0.226 1.000 
 IMD 0.643 0.829 0.786 0.778 0.822 0.678 0.277 1.000 
Panel D: Industrial Metals – Crisis period only 
  Alum Copper Lead Nickel Zinc Tin PMD IMD 
Alum 1.000 
       Copper 0.642 1.000 
      Lead 0.609 0.712 1.000 
     Nickel 0.488 0.731 0.654 1.000 
    Zinc 0.426 0.672 0.573 0.596 1.000 
   Tin 0.470 0.589 0.475 0.579 0.421 1.000 
  IMDX 0.640 0.846 0.745 0.768 0.664 0.610 
  PMD 0.225 0.245 0.211 0.205 0.141 0.320 1.000 
 IMD 0.709 0.902 0.840 0.859 0.771 0.733 0.276 1.000 
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Table 3: Hedge and safe haven characteristics of precious metals – Full sample period 
This table reports estimation results for the models in Eqs(1a), (1b) and (1c) for the full sample period, with individual precious metals as the 
dependent variables in Eq(1a). SH1 tests the hypothesis  +  = 0, SH2 tests the hypothesis  +  +  = 0, SH3 tests the hypothesis  +  
+  +  = 0. The asterisks ***, **, * represent significance of the estimates at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Gold 
 
Silver 
Bond 
 
SH1 SH2 SH3 
 
 
SH1 SH2 SH3 
Austria  0.008  0.201 -1.860***  0.057 
 
-0.207**  0.389  0.342  0.061 
Belgium -0.107*** -0.026 -1.929*** -0.052 
 
-0.194**  0.182  0.346  0.077 
Finland  0.013  0.252  0.223  0.062 
 
-0.070  0.386  0.336 -0.072 
France -0.055 -0.148 -1.909*** -0.126 
 
-0.117  0.175  0.579**  0.058 
Germany  0.019  0.203* -1.630***  0.062 
 
-0.239*** -0.124 -0.072 -0.167 
Greece -0.068*** -0.005 -0.135 -0.011 
 
 0.001  0.006  0.087  0.005 
Italy -0.141*** -0.143 -0.190 -0.093 
 
-0.233*** -0.360** -0.279 -0.263** 
Netherlands -0.118***  0.043 -1.987***  0.077 
 
-0.110  0.546*  0.228  0.110 
Portugal -0.073*** -0.149*  0.025 -0.095*** 
 
-0.130*** -0.106  0.175 -0.058 
Spain -0.045  0.100 -0.011 -0.059 
 
-0.058 -0.050  0.333 -0.059 
EMU  0.110  0.446**  0.143  0.133 
 
-0.122  0.446  0.186  0.075 
UK -0.025  0.105 -0.013  0.070 
 
-0.131*  0.359  0.258  0.154 
US -0.026  0.061  0.090  0.054  -0.008  0.163  0.045  0.014 
          
 
Platinum 
 
Palladium 
Bond 
 
SH1 SH2 SH3 
 
 
SH1 SH2 SH3 
Austria -0.116*  0.086  0.343  0.089 
 
-0.155*  0.092  0.140 -0.365** 
Belgium -0.098*  0.133 -0.115  0.110 
 
-0.049 -0.173  0.029 -0.367** 
Finland -0.106**  0.128 -0.115 -0.001 
 
-0.123 -0.094  0.736** -0.211 
France -0.116**  0.028 -0.059  0.061 
 
-0.055 -0.356  0.035 -0.496*** 
Germany -0.173*** -0.005 -0.159 -0.023 
 
-0.279*** -0.215  0.089 -0.398** 
Greece  0.063*  0.030  0.011  0.076** 
 
 0.094* -0.045  0.120  0.032 
Italy -0.073* -0.135 -0.131 -0.119 
 
-0.006 -0.048  0.183 -0.194 
Netherlands -0.079  0.089 -0.138 -0.038 
 
-0.137 -0.453* -0.660** -0.817*** 
Portugal -0.043 -0.238*** -0.107 -0.084* 
 
 0.028  0.087  0.516** -0.003 
Spain  0.027 -0.011  0.100 -0.061 
 
-0.006 -0.446**  0.269 -0.178 
EMU -0.104  0.261  0.023  0.122 
 
-0.323***  0.330  0.426  0.016 
UK -0.113** -0.056 -0.112 -0.034 
 
-0.173** -0.031 -0.391 -0.29 
US -0.017 -0.090 -0.146 -0.081  -0.079  0.268 -0.365 -0.178 
 
32 
 
Table 4: Hedge and safe haven characteristics of industrial metals – Full sample period 
This table reports estimation results for the models in Eqs(1a), (1b) and (1c) for the full sample period, with individual industrial metals as the 
dependent variables in Eq(1a). SH1 tests the hypothesis  +  = 0, SH2 tests the hypothesis  +  +  = 0, SH3 tests the hypothesis  +  
+  +  = 0. The asterisks ***, **, * represent significance of the estimates at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Aluminium 
 
Copper 
Bond 
 
SH1 SH2 SH3 
 
 
SH1 SH2 SH3 
Austria -0.460*** -0.246 -0.110 -0.124 
 
-0.771*** -0.286  0.283 -0.028 
Belgium -0.387*** -0.180  0.028 -0.037 
 
-0.602*** -0.268 -0.022 -0.088 
Finland -0.357*** -0.022  0.079  0.070 
 
-0.680*** -0.091  0.297  0.187 
France -0.263***  0.030  0.039 -0.127 
 
-0.586*** -0.370 -0.189 -0.178 
Germany -0.435*** -0.219 -0.088 -0.094 
 
-0.872*** -0.772*** -0.074 -0.204 
Greece -0.072*** -0.035  0.387***  0.027 
 
-0.069*** -0.138*  0.383**  0.047 
Italy -0.207*** -0.039 -0.173  0.059 
 
-0.396*** -0.109  0.081  0.207* 
Netherlands -0.367*** -0.216 -0.392* -0.269** 
 
-0.828*** -0.574** -0.548* -0.327 
Portugal -0.129***  0.075  0.365**  0.007 
 
-0.168***  0.032  0.324*  0.014 
Spain -0.237***  0.148  0.244  0.056 
 
-0.405*** -0.021  0.393  0.051 
EMU -0.474*** -0.085  0.238 -0.085 
 
-1.092*** -1.036*** -0.336 -0.574*** 
UK -0.080 -0.139  0.131 -0.173* 
 
-0.421*** -0.115  0.307  0.019 
US -0.169*** -0.120 -0.121 -0.172**  -0.392*** -0.139 -0.290 -0.267** 
          
 
Lead 
 
Nickel 
Bond 
 
SH1 SH2 SH3 
 
 
SH1 SH2 SH3 
Austria -0.680*** -0.108  0.161  0.131 
 
-0.821*** -0.049  0.148  0.225 
Belgium -0.522*** -0.104  0.293  0.215 
 
-0.502***  0.050  0.248  0.188 
Finland -0.701*** -0.198 -0.105  0.204 
 
-0.597***  0.344  0.300  0.374** 
France -0.492*** -0.187  0.183  0.041 
 
-0.538*** -0.239 -0.481 -0.155 
Germany -0.763*** -0.467  0.074  0.008 
 
-0.820*** -0.415  0.140  0.101 
Greece -0.056 -0.028  0.182  0.040 
 
-0.028  0.124  0.296  0.076 
Italy -0.348***  0.017 -0.204  0.157 
 
-0.298*** -0.047  0.019  0.160 
Netherlands -0.824*** -0.494* -0.343 -0.082 
 
-0.738*** -0.357 -0.747* -0.305 
Portugal -0.199*** -0.033  0.278  0.019 
 
-0.138**  0.129  0.517**  0.090 
Spain -0.433***  0.034  0.298  0.211 
 
-0.295***  0.127  1.107***  0.245 
EMU -0.979*** -0.739** -0.214 -0.259 
 
-0.988*** -0.723 -0.474 -0.597 
UK -0.335*** -0.439*  0.026 -0.226 
 
-0.246** -0.236  0.004 -0.245 
US -0.372*** -0.451** -0.436** -0.327**  -0.347*** -0.350* -0.569** -0.591*** 
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Table 4: Hedge and safe haven characteristics of industrial metals – Full sample period (cont’d) 
This table reports estimation results for the models in Eqs(1a), (1b) and (1c) for the full sample period, with individual industrial metals as the 
dependent variables in Eq(1a). SH1 tests the hypothesis  +  = 0, SH2 tests the hypothesis  +  +  = 0, SH3 tests the hypothesis  +  
+  +  = 0. The asterisks ***, **, * represent significance of the estimates at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Tin 
 
Zinc 
Bond 
 
SH1 SH2 SH3 
 
 
SH1 SH2 SH3 
Austria -0.607*** -0.206  0.190  0.244 
 
-0.599***  0.245  0.217  0.259* 
Belgium -0.483*** -0.537** -0.067 -0.054 
 
-0.419*** -0.234  0.096  0.065 
Finland -0.501*** -0.159  0.027  0.205 
 
-0.494***  0.083  0.463*  0.323** 
France -0.366*** -0.007 -0.283  0.042 
 
-0.391*** -0.002 -0.082  0.076 
Germany -0.626*** -0.398* -0.057  0.085 
 
-0.664*** -0.143  0.096  0.164 
Greece -0.067* -0.045  0.198  0.014 
 
-0.043  0.028  0.280  0.016 
Italy -0.294*** -0.149 -0.175  0.162 
 
-0.261*** -0.110  0.188  0.227** 
Netherlands -0.458*** -0.408* -0.224 -0.259 
 
-0.571*** -0.058 -0.125  0.005 
Portugal -0.168*** -0.247* -0.068 -0.047 
 
-0.159*** -0.188  0.378**  0.046 
Spain -0.349*** -0.010  0.338  0.175 
 
-0.294***  0.153  0.544**  0.217 
EMU -0.849*** -0.821** -0.444 -0.310 
 
-0.943*** -0.587* -0.413 -0.382* 
UK -0.111* -0.253  0.044 -0.218 
 
-0.250*** -0.220  0.370* -0.110 
US -0.133*** -0.075  0.079 -0.216**  -0.320*** -0.234 -0.360** -0.270*** 
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Table 5: Hedge and safe haven characteristics of portfolio of metals  
This table reports results for the models in Eqs(1a), (1b) and (1c) for the full sample period, with portfolios of metals as the dependent variables 
in Eq(1a). SH1 tests the hypothesis  +  = 0, SH2 tests the hypothesis  +  +  = 0, SH3 tests the hypothesis  +  +  +  = 0. The 
asterisks ***, **, * represent significance of the estimates at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Portfolio of Industrial Metals 
 
Portfolio of Precious Metals 
Bond 
 
SH1 SH2 SH3 
 
 
SH1 SH2 SH3 
Austria -0.660*** -0.086  0.174  0.125 
 
-0.127**  0.235  0.273  0.021 
Belgium -0.477*** -0.197  0.150  0.030 
 
-0.112**  0.026  0.040 -0.034 
Finland -0.575*** -0.007  0.179  0.213** 
 
-0.050  0.216  0.243 -0.054 
France -0.428*** -0.129 -0.046 -0.073 
 
-0.083* -0.090  0.057 -0.130 
Germany -0.709*** -0.413**  0.055  0.020 
 
-0.160*** -0.032 -0.010 -0.113 
Greece -0.054* -0.029  0.262*  0.039 
 
 0.020  0.008  0.041  0.023 
Italy -0.291*** -0.043 -0.020  0.164 
 
-0.110*** -0.201* -0.209 -0.177** 
Netherlands -0.639*** -0.397** -0.380 -0.244* 
 
-0.077  0.137 -0.141 -0.096 
Portugal -0.151*** -0.016  0.321**  0.027 
 
-0.070** -0.103  0.078 -0.040 
Spain -0.328***  0.135  0.537***  0.182 
 
-0.018 -0.114  0.166 -0.083 
EMU -0.879*** -0.678*** -0.259 -0.355* 
 
-0.106*  0.356  0.189  0.118 
UK -0.244*** -0.235  0.131 -0.159 
 
-0.092*  0.080 -0.051 -0.024 
US -0.266*** -0.159 -0.179 -0.264***   0.021  0.061 -0.078 -0.077 
          
 
Portfolio of Industrial and Precious Metals 
 Bond 
 
SH1 SH2 SH3 
 
    
Austria -0.463*** 0.045 0.195 0.115 
 
    
Belgium -0.360*** -0.099 0.071 0.038 
 
    
Finland -0.363*** 0.085 0.254 0.129 
 
    
France -0.291*** -0.086 0.017 -0.052 
 
    
Germany -0.491*** -0.162 0.090 0.049 
 
    
Greece -0.038* -0.037 0.196* 0.024 
 
    
Italy -0.218*** -0.090 -0.033 0.053 
 
    
Netherlands -0.429*** -0.216 -0.322* -0.162 
 
    
Portugal -0.140*** -0.078 0.231** 0.008 
 
    
Spain -0.224*** 0.070 0.406*** 0.131 
 
    
EMU -0.581*** -0.247 -0.061 -0.167 
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UK -0.184*** -0.089 0.048 -0.082 
 
    
US -0.159*** -0.095 -0.094 -0.182***      
 
Table 6: Hedge and safe haven characteristics of precious metals – sub period analysis 
This table reports estimation results for the models in Eqs(1a), (1b) and (1c) for the three sub-periods, with individual precious metals as the 
dependent variables in Eq(1a). SH1 tests the hypothesis 0 + 1 = 0, SH2 tests the hypothesis 0 + 1 + 2 = 0, SH3 tests the hypothesis 0 + 1 + 2 
+ 3 = 0. Panel A presents results for the period July 1993 to December 2000, Panel B presents results for the period January 2001 to December 
2006 and Panel C presents results for the period January 2007 to June 2012. The asterisks ***, **, * represent significance of the estimates at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: July 1993 to December 2000 
 
Gold   Silver   Platinum   Palladium 
Bond 0 SH1 
 
0 SH1 
 
0 SH1  
0 SH1 
Austria -0.096* -0.053 
 
-0.542*** -0.377 
 
-0.197** -0.084 
 
-0.198 0.027 
Belgium -0.122** 0.015 
 
-0.476*** 0.204 
 
-0.198** 0.14 
 
-0.148 0.085 
Finland -0.090** 0.007 
 
-0.134 -0.056 
 
-0.058 0.173 
 
-0.073 -0.198 
France -0.111** -0.102 
 
-0.203* 0.305 
 
-0.112* -0.078 
 
-0.038 -0.015 
Germany -0.109** 0.1 
 
-0.604*** -0.486 
 
-0.206** 0.195 
 
-0.185 -0.154 
Greece -0.439 0.838 
 
-0.799*** -0.911 
 
0.099 1.361 
 
0.306 1.893** 
Italy -0.093** -0.071 
 
-0.395*** -0.357 
 
-0.145*** -0.065 
 
-0.117 -0.106 
Netherlands -0.165*** -0.003 
 
-0.257* 0.533 
 
-0.017 0.127 
 
-0.057 -0.11 
Portugal -0.082* -0.181 
 
-0.375*** -0.397 
 
-0.106 -0.308 
 
-0.148 -0.174 
Spain 0.055 0.075 
 
-0.151 -0.547* 
 
0.01 -0.122 
 
-0.203* -0.701*** 
EMU -0.988*** -0.193 
 
-0.998*** -0.332 
 
-0.258 0.863 
 
-0.127 0.838 
UK -0.045 -0.172 
 
-0.236** 0.018 
 
-0.087 -0.029 
 
-0.056 -0.039 
US -0.083** 0.038  -0.049 -0.106  0.005 -0.015   -0.004 0.092 
Panel B: January 2001 to December 2006 
 
Gold    Silver   Platinum   Palladium  
Bond 0 SH1 
 
0 SH1 
 
0 SH1  
0 SH1 
Austria -0.134 0.004 
 
0.015 0.691 
 
0.067 0.084 
 
0.641*** 0.792 
Belgium -0.004 0.309 
 
0.032 0.53 
 
0.023 -0.04 
 
0.637*** 0.953 
Finland -0.15 0.168 
 
0.025 0.829* 
 
0.049 0.003 
 
0.734*** 0.69 
France -0.026 0.145 
 
0.04 0.718 
 
0.021 -0.171 
 
0.674*** 0.424 
Germany -0.17 0.58 
 
0.006 0.496 
 
0.006 -0.167 
 
0.586*** 0.102 
Greece -0.067 0.194 
 
0.019 0.887* 
 
0.036 0.085 
 
0.698*** 1.05 
Italy 0.211 0.606 
 
-0.124 0.187 
 
0.119 -0.202 
 
0.742*** 0.905 
Netherlands -0.005 0.326 
 
0.016 0.676 
 
0.008 -0.093 
 
0.631*** 1.264* 
Portugal 0.047 0.179 
 
-0.023 0.612 
 
0.038 -0.092 
 
0.774*** 1.876** 
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Spain -0.017 0.204 
 
-0.009 0.541 
 
0.04 -0.235 
 
0.607*** 0.505 
EMU -0.019 0.134 
 
0.02 0.528 
 
0.007 -0.114 
 
0.595*** 0.188 
UK 0.004 0.067 
 
0.077 0.04 
 
-0.02 -0.845* 
 
0.358* 0.289 
US 0.148** 0.136  0.076 0.375  -0.04 0.045   0.208 -0.257 
            Table 6 cont’d 
          Panel C: January 2007 to June 2012 
 
Gold   Silver   Platinum    Palladium  
Bond 0 SH1 
 
0 SH1 
 
0 SH1  
0 SH1 
Austria 0.099 0.192 
 
-0.064 1.431** 
 
-0.179 0.524 
 
-0.711*** 0.562 
Belgium -0.106 -0.32 
 
-0.136 -0.367 
 
0.066 0.409 
 
-0.164 0.484 
Finland 0.255** -0.162 
 
-0.173 -0.881 
 
-0.327*** -0.136 
 
-1.021*** -1.991** 
France 0.072 0.14 
 
-0.194 0.374 
 
-0.222* 0.124 
 
-0.661*** -0.853 
Germany 0.294*** 0.820** 
 
-0.18 0.55 
 
-0.358*** -0.713 
 
-1.088*** -1.899*** 
Greece -0.030** 0.126** 
 
0.014 0.137 
 
0.072** 0.114 
 
0.056 -0.067 
Italy -0.129** -0.602*** 
 
-0.054 -0.68 
 
0.096 -0.36 
 
-0.052 -0.838* 
Netherlands 0.252** 0.169 
 
-0.061 0.275 
 
-0.272** 0.269 
 
-0.908*** -1.698*** 
Portugal -0.073** -0.276*** 
 
-0.071 -0.207 
 
-0.027 -0.307** 
 
-0.02 -0.396* 
Spain -0.106* 0.175 
 
-0.005 -0.012 
 
0.158* 0.258 
 
-0.071 -0.371 
EMU 0.294*** 0.819** 
 
-0.178 0.551 
 
-0.357*** -0.712 
 
-1.086*** -1.899*** 
UK 0.108 1.207*** 
 
-0.119 1.799** 
 
-0.209** -0.296 
 
-0.838*** -0.496 
US -0.018 0.094  -0.155 -0.744  -0.064 -0.403   -0.445*** -0.041 
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Table 7: Hedge and safe haven characteristics of industrial metals – sub-period analysis 
This table reports estimation results for the models in Eqs(1a), (1b) and (1c) for the three sub-periods, with individual industrial metals as the dependent variables in Eq(1a). 
SH1 tests the hypothesis 0 + 1 = 0, SH2 tests the hypothesis 0 + 1 + 2 = 0, SH3 tests the hypothesis 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 = 0. Panel A presents results for the period July 1993 
to December 2000, Panel B presents results for the period January 2001 to December 2006 and Panel C presents results for the period January 2007 to June 2012. The 
asterisks ***, **, * represent significance of the estimates at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: July 1993 to December 2000 
 
Aluminium   Copper   Lead   Nickel   Tin   Zinc 
Bond 0 SH1 
 
0 SH1 
 
0 SH1   0 SH1 
 
0 SH1   0 SH1 
Austria -0.48*** -0.88*** 
 
-0.55*** -0.35 
 
-0.45*** -0.09 
 
-0.59*** -0.24 
 
-0.36*** -0.61** 
 
-0.45*** 0.11 
Belgium -0.31*** -0.46* 
 
-0.41*** -0.19 
 
-0.27* 0.14 
 
-0.24 0.08 
 
-0.25** -0.59** 
 
-0.24* -0.02 
Finland -0.18** -0.53*** 
 
-0.28*** -0.13 
 
-0.27** -0.23 
 
-0.26* -0.00 
 
-0.19** -0.35 
 
-0.18* -0.40 
France -0.14* -0.29 
 
-0.32*** -0.51 
 
-0.28** -0.43 
 
-0.17 -0.72* 
 
-0.04 -0.21 
 
-0.16 -0.04 
Germany -0.43*** -0.49** 
 
-0.56*** -0.30 
 
-0.36*** 0.32 
 
-0.43*** -0.03 
 
-0.39*** -0.15 
 
-0.38*** 0.16 
Greece -0.35 0.01 
 
-0.45** -0.63 
 
-0.39 -0.40 
 
-0.34 -0.30 
 
-0.19 0.40 
 
-0.46 0.28 
Italy -0.11 -0.26 
 
-0.18* -0.07 
 
-0.17 -0.17 
 
-0.09 -0.15 
 
-0.01 -0.06 
 
-0.03 -0.09 
Netherlands -0.18* -0.48* 
 
-0.43*** -0.48 
 
-0.52*** -0.37 
 
-0.35** -0.41 
 
-0.05 -0.47 
 
-0.26* -0.10 
Portugal -0.04 -0.11 
 
-0.11 0.03 
 
-0.27*** -0.29 
 
0.03 0.12 
 
-0.13 -0.52** 
 
-0.09 -0.30 
Spain -0.20** 0.07 
 
-0.23** 0.26 
 
-0.28** 0.30 
 
-0.08 0.32 
 
-0.15* 0.09 
 
-0.08 0.37 
EMU -0.73*** -0.09 
 
-0.82*** -1.25 
 
-0.40* 0.55 
 
-0.68** -0.28 
 
-0.49*** 0.21 
 
-0.61*** -0.20 
UK -0.03 -0.14 
 
-0.13 -0.19 
 
-0.06 -0.31 
 
0.05 -0.26 
 
0.13* -0.50** 
 
-0.07 -0.28 
US -0.15** 0.06  -0.17* -0.22  -0.15 -0.04  -0.17 -0.14 
 
-0.01 -0.14  -0.14* -0.16 
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Table 7 cont’d. 
Panel B: January 2001 to December 2006 
  
 
Aluminium   Copper   Lead   Nickel   Tin   Zinc 
Bond 0 SH1 
 
0 SH1 
 
0 SH1  
0 SH1 
 
0 SH1   0 SH1 
Austria -0.70*** -0.45 
 
-1.04*** -0.76 
 
-0.80*** -0.55 
 
-0.74*** -0.33 
 
-1.01*** -0.72 
 
-0.94*** -0.61 
Belgium -0.71*** -0.34 
 
-1.06*** -0.88* 
 
-0.88*** -0.74 
 
-0.79*** -0.85 
 
-0.99*** -0.90* 
 
-0.96*** -0.78* 
Finland -0.72*** -0.24 
 
-1.08*** -0.46 
 
-0.86*** -0.66 
 
-0.73*** -0.14 
 
-1.00*** -0.41 
 
-0.94*** -0.39 
France -0.68*** -0.24 
 
-1.01*** -0.37 
 
-0.86*** -0.40 
 
-0.70*** 0.10 
 
-0.85*** -0.13 
 
-0.89*** -0.30 
Germany -0.71*** -0.15 
 
-0.99*** -0.58 
 
-0.83*** -0.38 
 
-0.78*** -0.11 
 
-0.91*** -0.42 
 
-0.91*** -0.33 
Greece -0.76*** -0.40 
 
-1.08*** -0.41 
 
-0.86*** -0.64 
 
-0.80*** -0.11 
 
-0.93*** -0.33 
 
-0.96*** -0.39 
Italy -0.73*** -0.59* 
 
-1.19*** -0.70 
 
-0.87*** -0.60 
 
-0.85*** -0.57 
 
-1.04*** -0.87 
 
-1.06*** -0.57 
Netherlands -0.68*** 0.10 
 
-0.99*** -0.36 
 
-0.76*** -0.31 
 
-0.70*** 0.01 
 
-0.90*** -0.28 
 
-0.87*** -0.27 
Portugal -0.74*** 0.05 
 
-1.02*** -0.71 
 
-0.88*** -0.39 
 
-0.67** -0.50 
 
-0.93*** -0.39 
 
-0.91*** -0.61 
Spain -0.72*** -0.17 
 
-1.13*** -0.62 
 
-0.95*** -0.46 
 
-0.81*** 0.12 
 
-0.96*** -0.16 
 
-0.95*** -0.42 
EMU -0.70*** -0.21 
 
-0.99*** -0.57 
 
-0.83*** -0.34 
 
-0.77*** -0.14 
 
-0.90*** -0.48 
 
-0.90*** -0.30 
UK -0.29*** -0.16 
 
-0.62*** -0.70 
 
-0.59*** -0.61 
 
-0.28 -0.59 
 
-0.39*** -0.61 
 
-0.45*** -0.12 
US -0.03 0.19  -0.30*** 0.23  -0.22* -0.20   -0.09 -0.39  -0.01 0.30  -0.29*** -0.14 
                  Panel C: January 2007 to June 2012 
  
 
Aluminium   Copper   Lead   Nickel   Tin   Zinc 
Bond 0 SH1 
 
0 SH1 
 
0 SH1   0 SH1 
 
0 SH1   0 SH1 
Austria -0.18* 0.28 
 
-0.88*** -0.62 
 
-1.10*** -0.35 
 
-1.15*** -0.65 
 
-0.77*** 0.30 
 
-0.66*** 0.47 
Belgium -0.17* 0.01 
 
-0.46*** -0.58 
 
-0.60*** -0.42 
 
-0.70*** -0.78 
 
-0.50*** -1.46*** 
 
-0.21 -0.11 
Finland -0.25** 0.60 
 
-1.15*** -1.13* 
 
-1.48*** -1.71* 
 
-1.25*** -0.68 
 
-0.94*** -1.47* 
 
-1.02*** -0.44 
France -0.11 0.59 
 
-0.70*** -0.03 
 
-0.82*** 0.67 
 
-1.02*** -0.51 
 
-0.74*** 0.14 
 
-0.55*** 0.63 
Germany -0.20** 0.01 
 
-1.19*** -1.89*** 
 
-1.59*** -2.98*** 
 
-1.25*** -2.46** 
 
-0.95*** -1.65** 
 
-1.11*** -1.69** 
Greece -0.02 0.01 
 
-0.01 -0.04 
 
-0.01 -0.05 
 
0.03 0.05 
 
-0.01 -0.06 
 
0.03 0.02 
Italy -0.07 -0.08 
 
-0.25*** -0.72* 
 
-0.24*** -0.39 
 
-0.35*** -0.47 
 
-0.39*** -0.65 
 
-0.26*** -0.67 
Netherlands -0.18* 1.41*** 
 
-1.15*** -0.85 
 
-1.55*** -1.34 
 
-1.24*** -1.46 
 
-0.84*** -1.12 
 
-0.95*** -0.02 
Portugal -0.05 -0.01 
 
-0.06 -0.06 
 
-0.09 0.00 
 
-0.13* -0.08 
 
-0.05 -0.04 
 
-0.08 -0.02 
Spain -0.06 -0.01 
 
-0.29*** -0.37 
 
-0.38*** 0.28 
 
-0.38*** -0.16 
 
-0.41*** -0.69 
 
-0.29*** 0.14 
EMU -0.20** 0.01 
 
-1.19*** -1.89*** 
 
-1.59*** -2.97*** 
 
-1.26*** -2.46** 
 
-0.94*** -1.65** 
 
-1.11*** -1.68** 
UK -0.04 -0.23 
 
-0.80*** -0.68 
 
-0.99*** -0.15 
 
-0.89*** -0.21 
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Figure 1: Dollar price indices of industrial and precious metals - July 1993 t0 June 2012 (July 1993 
= 100).   
Panel A: Dollar Price Indices of the Six Industrial Metals – July 1993 to June 2012 
 
 
 
Panel B: Dollar Price Indices of the Four Precious Metals – July 1993 to June 2012 
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Figure 2: Post-shock performance of equally weighted portfolios consisting of the bond and 
dedicated precious metals 
 
Panel A: Equally weighted portfolio of EMU benchmark bond and individual precious metals 
 
 
Panel B: Equally weighted portfolio of the UK bond and individual precious metals  
 
 
Panel C: Equally weighted portfolio of the US bond and individual precious metals 
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Figure 3: Post-shock performance of equally weighted portfolios consisting of the bond and 
dedicated industrial metals 
 
Panel A: Equally weighted portfolio of the EMU benchmark bond and individual industrial metals
  
 
 
Panel B: Equally weighted portfolio of the UK bond and individual industrial metals 
 
 
Panel C: Equally weighted portfolio of the US bond and individual industrial metals 
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Figure 4: Post-shock performance of equally weighted portfolios consisting of the bond and 
portfolio of metals 
 
Panel A: Equally weighted portfolio of the EMU benchmark bond and portfolio of metals  
 
 
Panel B: Equally weighted portfolio of the UK bond and portfolio of metals 
 
 
Panel C: Equally weighted portfolio of the US bond and portfolio of metals 
 
 
 
 
